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EDITORIAL 
by Antonio Missiroli
States of the Union 
What’s in a name – one wonders, 
after listening to some reactions to 
the “State of the Union” speech 
delivered by Commission President 
Barroso at the European Parliament 
in Strasbourg on 7 September. The 
intuitive, subliminal association with 
the American tradition of the US 
President’s annual “State of the 
Union” address to Congress, in fact, 
triggered a wave of reactions and 
comparisons that, in turn, dwelt 
more on the form than the 
substance of the message sent to the 
elected representatives of the 
European citizens.
Let us set the record straight. The 
speech built on existing practice (i.e. 
the President of the Commission 
reporting to the EP on the College’s 
work programme) but took also into 
account both the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty – including the 
reinforced accountability of the 
President to the assembly – and the 
recent inter-institutional agreement 
between the two institutions, which 
explicitly mentions holding such an 
event at the first plenary after the 
summer break (or recess, if one 
wants to borrow again from 
American politics). Moreover, 
resorting to the “State of the Union”
formula is nothing new: it was used a 
few years ago to qualify debates 
introduced by the then EP President 
( K l a u s  H ä n s c h )  w i t h  t h e 
participation of Commission 
President Jacques Santer. 
For his part, and for some time, 
High Representative Javier Solana 
gave a regular “State of the Union”
speech focused on foreign policy at 
the annual conference of the 
EU Institute for Security Studies in 
Paris. And many civil society debates 
all across the EU have used the 
expression to try and assess progress 
or deadlock in the European 
integration process.
Last but certainly not least, the 
comparison with the US is 
understandable but somewhat 
inappropriate: loosely enshrined in 
the American Constitution (and 
originally modelled after the Queen’s 
Speech to Parliament in the UK), the 
President’s “address” to Congress 
on the State of the Union has been 
del ivered in different ways 
throughout the centuries. 
The term was first used by Franklin 
D. Roosevelt in 1934 and has 
become generally accepted practice 
since the end of World War II. The 
established tradition now entails a 
long speech to a joint session of the 
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US Congress held in the House premises on 
Capitol Hill at the beginning of the year, in 
which the President not only reports on the 
condition of the nation but also articulates policy 
priorities and outlines his legislative agenda. Such 
an address, however, is not followed by a plenary 
debate – as opposed to what happened in the EP 
earlier this month.
Back to the future
This said, President Barroso did exactly that: he 
gave his assessment of where we stand – in 
September 2010 – and illustrated plans and 
proposals for the months ahead, looking both 
back and forth.
Accordingly, the current state of the European 
Union is solid, despite (or maybe also thanks to) 
the severe test it was confronted with earlier this 
year during the sovereign debt crisis. Indeed, 
while the founding fathers of EMU thought that 
potential imbalances would be primarily internal 
and supply-driven, the actual shocks eventually 
came from outside and were essentially demand-
driven. On top of that, a combination of specific 
national crises with different causes concurred to 
triggering the closest thing we have ever had to a 
systemic crisis. 
In the end, however, unity of purpose, solidarity 
and determination prevailed, and the eye of the 
financial storm went by without breaking either 
the euro zone or the EU as a whole. We are not 
out of the woods yet – as the President himself 
made very clear – but we are now laying the 
foundations for completing Maastricht’s 
unfinished business and opening a new phase of 
economic integration.
The present state of the Union, however, is also 
fluid. The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty 
has just started and will arguably remain a work 
in progress until the end of this institutional 
term. The overarching goal for everybody should 
be the development of a more effective EU, 
capable of delivering tangible results for its 
citizens, both internally and externally, and of 
creating synergies with national governments. 
This is also what President Barroso meant with 
his call to “think European” and overcome 
narrow calculations and petty disputes.
The Red Queen
Yet the EU’s condition is fluid also because the 
sovereign debt crisis has further reinforced the 
need for internal reforms. There are no laurels to 
rest on. Like the Red Queen in Lewis Carroll’s 
Alice in Wonderland, Europe must move fast 
forward in order to remain where it stands: 
economically, socially and politically. 
In this respect, “Europe 2020” is not simply a 
strategy for the Commission’s own policies. It is 
also a potential script for all, so to speak. Indeed, 
if the Member States adopted the same rationale 
and frontloaded the same priorities, the 
“multiplier” effect on the continent’s structural 
fabric would be quite significant – especially in 
times of cash-strapped public policies – and 
would provide a shared compass to navigate 
difficult international waters on the boat we are 
all in.
The debate in the EP plenary demonstrated fairly 
well the need to engage in a frank public 
discussion on the state of our Union – well 
beyond Strasbourg or Brussels. It is indeed 
telling that, roughly during the same week, two 
distinct opinion polls (Eurobarometer and 
Transatlantic Trends, both conducted in the late 
spring) conveyed a similar picture of the 
prevailing mood among European citizens: 
namely, one of disenchantment coupled with 
pragmatism. A growing number of interviewees, 
especially in the older Member States, are 
sceptical about belonging to the EU or about the 
euro. An equally growing number of them, 
however, are also convinced that the only way to 
address effectively the challenges we are all 
confronted with is through the EU. Indeed, in 
Barroso’s words, we are bound to “swim 
together, or sink separately”.
This issue of BEPA Monthly aims at developing 
more in-depth some elements of both the speech 
and the ensuing debate, and to indicate some 
possible ways ahead.
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Over the next two years the EU budget will 
undergo a major review. The Lisbon Treaty has 
significantly changed the procedures for the 
adoption of the multiannual financial framework 
(MFF) and the annual budget proper. 
Furthermore, already the last negotiations on the 
MFF, in 2005, ended with a strong 
recommendation from the European Council 
and the European Parliament to the Commission 
to “undertake a full, wide ranging review 
covering all aspects of EU spending, including 
the CAP, and of resources, including the UK 
rebate, to report on in 2008/9” (Inter-
Institutional Agreement, IIA, May 2006)
The time frame
During the IIA negotiations, in fact, some 
participants proposed that the mid-term review 
should allow for changes to the ceilings included 
in the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 
to be adopted for 2007-2013. This suggestion 
was supported with two different arguments: a 
call for a five-year term for the MFF (instead of 
the seven proposed by the Commission), and the 
possibility to consult the new European 
Parliament to be elected in 2009. 
While it is now clear that the agreed MFF 
ceilings will stay for the seven years, the question 
of the duration of the next financial framework 
remains open and will be addressed through the 
review.
The EP insists for a direct link between the 
duration of parliamentary mandates and that of 
the MFF. But the process of preparation, 
negotiation and decision for the financial 
framework is a very long one: its average 
duration in the last two rounds – from the initial 
preparation of proposals by the Commission to 
the final agreement – has been nearly four years, 
almost two of which for negotiations only. 
It is therefore evident that the period of 
execution of the financial framework cannot be 
mechanically grafted onto the period of the 
political mandate, or else – paradoxically – each 
Commission and EP would execute a financial 
framework prepared and decided by others while 
preparing, negotiating and (hopefully) agreeing 
on a financial framework to be executed by 
others.
So the real question that needs to be addressed is 
how to give a positive answer to a legitimate 
request, while taking also into account that the 
new Treaty only refers to a “at least five-year 
period”. 
In his speech on the State of the Union, the 
President of the Commission came up with an 
innovative approach: “I know that one issue of 
interest to this Parliament is the duration of the next 
budget. Various options exist. I would like to look 
at a 10-year framework, with a mid-term review 
of the financial dimension after five years – a 
“five plus five” option. This will give us longer 
term planning and a clearer link with the 
mandates of both our institutions.”
This approach can contribute to reconciling the 
EP request for ownership and accountability 
with the need for long term investments that 
characterises EU structural policies. 
Nevertheless, the question remains: when would 
the financial framework begin and end? 
A pragmatic solution would be to take the present 
situation and calendar as a given: this Commission 
will present its proposals in 2011; negotiations will 
be finalised and agreement reached in time for the 
new MFF to be in place at the beginning of 2014. 
The next EP and Commission mandates will start 
in the course of 2014 and will therefore execute the 
agreed budget.
The leverage effect 
In the same speech, President Barroso also 
referred to the need to explore new sources 
of financing and to increase the leverage 
effect of the European budget, the EU 
project bonds. 
1 New avenues for the EU budget
By Vasco Cal*
* Adviser, Analysis team, BEPA.
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In recent EU history, at least three different 
proposals have been put forward to this effect: 
1) former President Jacques Delors suggested 
that the Commission tap into capital markets 
issuing bonds to finance investments of 
“European interest”; 
2) Eurogroup President President Jean-Claude 
Juncker proposed that bonds be issued in 
common by euro zone members to address 
funding problems; 
3) and notably the EU “project bonds” now 
floated by President Barroso. 
The novelty in the last proposal is that such 
“project bonds” would be issued by the 
European Investment Bank: “We should also 
explore new sources of financing for major 
European infrastructure projects. For instance, 
I will propose the establishment of EU project 
bonds, together with the European Investment 
Bank”. 
Accordingly, the EIB would increase its 
operations, albeit with an important 
constraint, i.e. keeping the “triple A” rating it 
currently enjoys. To this end, the participation 
of the EU and national budgets will be 
decisive: depending on the ambition of the 
projects, the EIB should increase its capital; at 
the same time, the EU budget should earmark 
the amounts needed to either co-finance the 
projects and/or guarantee the EIB loans –
something that is already being done but on a 
much smaller scale.
What role for the Commission?
In a context of strong restrictions to national 
budgets, the European Commission could 
develop a slightly different role concerning these 
projects. 
The Commission could indeed: 
a) identify (building on the knowledge of its 
services and with the help of the Member States) 
the most important projects to develop at EU 
level regarding the infrastructures needed for the 
new smart, greener and inclusive economy; 
b) it could establish the overall framework for 
the areas concerned, addressing issues of 
compatibility, network integrity, need for 
complementary interventions (e.g. regulation), 
and missing links; 
c) the Commission could also evaluate and assess 
the technical and financial feasibility of the 
relevant projects; and 
d) it could negotiate with the different 
stakeholders and the EIB the adequate financial 
engineering for future returns – including the 
possibility of issuing EU “project bonds”. 
The financing solutions should be tailored to 
each case and to the specific capacities of the 
Member States involved. They should also take 
into account the market signals that issuing 
bonds may send. Priority should be given to 
projects with sound economic and financial 
feasibility. 
Reactions from and involvement of the private 
sector and capital markets should equally 
constitute determinant factors for the “go 
ahead”. This would also help avoid the “wait and 
see” attitude from the most directly interested 
partners that recently obliged public intervention 
to replace the lack of interest from the private 
sector.
With this new approach, not only will the EU 
contribute to stimulating cross-border demand 
but it will also turn this into a strategic 
opportunity to 1) upgrade and modernise key 
infrastructures and 2) to guarantee the integrity 
of nets and grids as well as the compatibility of 
technologies. 
A “project by project” approach and a tailor-
made financial engineering will also avoid the 
“one size fits all” approaches of the past. And a 
decisive role for the private sector will avoid 
building ever more “cathedrals in the desert”.
As the President of the Commission concludes; 
“Europe offers real added value. That is why I 
will be pushing for an ambitious post-2013 
budget for Europe. I believe we should pool our 
means to back our policy priorities. The issue is 
not about spending more or less, but spending 
more intelligently, by looking at European and 
national budgets together.” 
bepa monthly 
September 2010 - Issue 39
5
Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. This was as 
true in Shakespeare’s Love’s Labours Lost as it is in 
the European Union. 
On the inside, as the latest Eurobarometer poll 
revealed, support for the EU in the older 
Member States has declined sharply while in 
most of the new ones it has remained stable 
despite the economic crisis. 
In 2008 Nouriel Roubini famously warned that 
Latvia would drag down the euro-zone. Yet the 
prophet-of-all-prophets underestimated both the 
determination of the Latvian government and 
the sturdiness of the people who saw their 
country’s level of domestic consumption fall by 
40 percent. Latvia has done a remarkable job by 
not only tightening the belt but also trying to 
reshape its economy. 
The EU has not been seen as an unconditional 
saviour or guarantor-of-last-resort, even though 
it would have been one if deemed necessary. 
Latvians took things into their own hands. By 
doing so, they displayed a healthy attitude 
towards the EU – an attitude that is more 
widespread among the new members: pragmatic 
and business-like rather than idealistic.
Similarly, there were only a handful of people at 
Pilsudski Square in Warsaw, at midnight on 
30 April 2004, when the EU flag was raised at 
the time of accession. Support for the EU is 
strong, especially in Poland, but there is little 
romanticism. 
For the new members, the EU is a place where 
you share common interests but also fight for 
your own interests. This may not necessarily be 
bad in today’s competitive times. 
Changing the public discourse
Mario Monti has repeatedly and convincingly 
spoken in favour of a new “package deal”
inside the EU to re-launch the single market. 
After what happened during the last decade 
with the euro, the enlargement and the 
economic crisis, the balance of costs and 
benefits indeed points to the need for a new 
“contract” inside the EU. 
It is bewildering that the Germans think of 
themselves as being on the losing side of the 
euro while all figures show the huge export 
benefits they have enjoyed from intra-EU trade 
fuelled by the common currency. And there are 
many more examples of countries feeling 
damaged or handicapped while in fact reaping 
huge returns from the integration process. The 
idea of putting forward a “macro impact 
assessment of the EU” ruffles many feathers 
among national political leaders. They fear 
having to explain Europe but, in reality, such 
exercise would help clear the air of false myths 
and unfair allegations. 
Apart from enormous gains for everybody, 
however, there is a real issue of asymmetrical 
distribution of benefits from the integration 
process. It needs to be better studied, 
understood and communicated. In addition, the 
impact of EU integration should be 
distinguished from the impact of globalisation –
the former usually and arguably helps prepare for 
the latter. New ways of addressing the existing 
asymmetries have to be found. 
External view(er)s 
Looking at the EU from the outside, the picture is 
mixed. On the one hand, we have a Russia that is 
opening up to Europe more than it has ever 
done since the time of Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s. 
Russia has understood that its economic viability 
and future cannot be built on the model of a 
“petro-state”. Getting closer to the EU is a way 
for the authorities to explain to their own 
population what needs to be done: this is, in 
essence, the coded message behind the 
“partnership for modernisation”. And addressing 
this renewed interest for a rapprochement with 
Russia will be a major foreign policy challenge 
for the EU in 2011. 
2 EU blues? The future can be brighter
By Pawel Swieboda
* Director of demosEUROPA - Centre for European Strategy, Poland
bepa monthly 
September 2010 - Issue 39
6
While interest in cooperation grows in Moscow, 
in Washington what seems to be growing is 
frustration with the EU’s perceived 
unwillingness to contribute adequately to US-led 
efforts, especially in Afghanistan. The problem 
lies both in managing mutual expectations (on 
either side) and in the EU’s own dilemma: 
Europeans are torn between a lack of appetite 
for being always led by the United States and 
their inability to go for the reverse, namely 
showing leadership, perhaps even vis-a-vis 
Americans. 
Somewhere in-between is China, which is 
mentally focused on its relationship with the US 
but for which the EU is a prospective promising, 
if somewhat puzzling, partner. The challenge 
there is that while China understands pretty well 
what goes on in the West, we have a much less 
clear picture of what goes on in China. 
If there is an area where the EU and China can 
work together, for instance, that is 
macroeconomic governance. The crisis has put 
China in a pivotal position in the world 
economy. Much of future growth is likely to 
depend on the dynamic in the Chinese market 
and other emerging markets. At the same time, 
Beijing has understood that exclusive reliance on 
exports and investment will not suffice as a 
driver of economic growth. The reshaping of the 
Chinese economy that is already under way 
should open up new opportunities in the area of 
services, including education and public health, 
where the EU has a competitive edge.
Engage, agree, and be confident
Apart from refocusing its global engagement, the 
EU also needs to adjust its methods. The 
missionary zeal which characterised the run-up 
to Copenhagen last year needs to be replaced by 
a strategy of locking partners into what they 
would see as a two-way street. 
Presence, visibility and cohesion are the key 
words. The EU is too timid in areas where its 
Member States have strong national interests. It 
also needs to sell better what it is doing both 
jointly and individually. 
Finally, cohesion is about aligning positions 
before speaking up. There is an interesting 
example of the disjoint reaction of EU countries 
to the Chinese commitment to 40-45 percent 
reduction in carbon intensity of the economy by 
2020, made in the run-up to Copenhagen. France 
said this was great because for the first time 
China made a serious commitment. The UK said 
that this was nothing new and that China would 
have met these targets anyway to address its own 
energy security objectives. There is plenty of 
room there for achieving a common 
denominator and stance.
The worst that can be said of the European 
Union in 2010 is that it is no longer an agenda-
setter. However, if the EU is not driving the 
agenda, who is? Are China or Brazil models for 
inspiration in terms of global governance?
Actually, most of what is on the international 
agenda is a result or a by-product of the EU 
policy process. Where the EU loses its edge is in 
the implementation phase. In part, this is a 
problem of size and scale, in a world where 
standards and norms will be shaped by those 
who can get a critical mass behind their ideas and 
solutions. But the EU can only matter in this 
world if it has more confidence in itself. This is 
not a time for splitting hair.
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3 Strategic partners: where from and what for
By João Marques de Almeida*
* Adviser, Outreach team, BEPA.
In his State of the Union speech in the European 
Parliament, earlier this month, President Barroso 
said that “as the strategic partnerships of the 21st
Century emerge, Europe should seize the 
challenge to define its future…Our partners are 
watching and are expecting us to engage as 
Europe, not just as 27 individual countries. If we 
don’t act together, Europe will not be a force in 
the world, and they will move on without us”.
For his part, the President of the European 
Council van Rompuy called an extraordinary 
meeting of the Heads of State and Government 
of the EU 27 – held on 16 September and open 
to the Foreign Ministers also – to discuss the 
concept and practice of strategic partnerships 
and their place in EU external relations, asking 
the High Representative and Vice-President of 
the Commission Baroness Ashton to start the 
debate. It will be followed by other discussions 
in future meetings of the European Council. 
Moreover, the next European Council (28-
29 October, two weeks before the EU-US 
summit to be held in Lisbon on 20 November) 
will look in some depth at the strategic 
partnership with the United States and, to quote 
the Conclusions of the last European Council, 
“will agree on the key political messages the 
European Union will bring to the summit”. 
Until the end of the year, the European Union 
still has scheduled summits with four other 
strategic partners: South Africa (28 September), 
China (6 October), Russia (7 December) and 
India (10 December) – after which, finally, the 
HR/VP will present a progress report on 
strategic partnerships to the 16-17 December 
European Council.
Strategic partner(ship)s: history and typology 
The first time the European Union used the 
term was in December 1998, when the Vienna 
European Council conclusions mentioned Russia 
as a “strategic partner to the Union”. Six months 
later, the conclusions of the Cologne European 
Council called “to strengthen the strategic 
partnership between Russia and the European 
Union”. 
In 2003, however, the European Security 
Strategy identified up to six strategic partners: 
the United States, Russia, Canada, Japan, China 
and India. 
Since then, the European Union has both 
deepened and widened such strategic 
partnerships. It now has nine: the six mentioned 
above plus Brazil, South Africa and Mexico. Of 
all these – and it is a point worth mentioning –
nine include traditional community matters, and 
six are exclusively focused on security and 
defence issues. 
It is also clear that the strategic partnerships are 
not all equal in importance or identical in shape. 
In this sense, a typology can be easily established: 
for historical, ideological, political and economic 
reasons, the United States is the most important 
strategic partner. The Conclusions of the last 
European Council define the “transatlantic 
relationship” as “a core element of the 
international system”. The United States could 
thus be seen as the core partner (the ESS calls it 
the “irreplaceable partner”). Curiously, however, 
there is no formal “strategic partnership” with 
the Americans, as if the United States was 
already a partner before the emergence of the 
idea of strategic partnerships. For the same set of 
reasons (albeit in a less significant way), Canada 
and Japan – one a NATO ally and both G-8 
members – are also informal and natural partners. 
Russia could be considered the neighbour partner. 
It is indeed the sole EU European strategic 
partner and the only one sharing common 
borders. In international relations territory and 
borders are quite significant, and indeed most of 
the issues in the EU-Russia relationship concern 
our common neighbourhood. Such peculiarity 
gives the strategic partnership with Russia a 
special nature.
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Then there are the emerging partners: China, India 
and Brazil. They are the B, the C and the I in the 
“BRICs” (Russia being the R) as well as the 
biggest emerging economies in the world. Most 
analysts agree that they will be 21st Century 
global powers. 
Lastly, there are two regional partners: South 
Africa and Mexico. Two criteria seem to guide 
the establishment of partnerships with such 
countries: their regional strategic and diplomatic 
influence, on the one hand, and the special 
interests of one or more EU members on the 
other. In this respect, we are likely to witness the 
establishment of further regional partnerships in 
the future – with Indonesia, for instance, or 
Australia (both members of the G-20). 
The global context and the European 
interest
The current strategic partnerships seem to be a 
political and diplomatic response to the 
emergence of a multi-polar world. Indeed, 
dealing with rising powers is one of the most 
important criteria for the EU to establish 
strategic partnerships, as those with the B(R)ICs, 
South Africa and Mexico demonstrate. Of 
course, sharing common values and historical 
commitments are also quite important, as the 
partnerships with the US, Japan and Canada 
confirm.  
However, the rationale behind the EU strategic 
partnerships seems also to highlight a particular 
approach to multi-polarity: the creation of a 
global “concert” of responsible and engaged 
partners rather than an unrestrained struggle for 
power between rivals. In this regard, such 
concert of and between strategic partners seeks 
to reinforce (and partly reshape) the multilateral 
global order – a “constitutional” goal for the EU, 
as it is confirmed by the Lisbon Treaty. 
Europe’s own historical experience shows the 
risks associated with multi-polarity just as the 
experience of European integration shows that 
the best way to address and prevent those risks is 
through multi-lateral agreements and 
commitments. Strategic partnerships are the 
EU’s contribution to avoid that the future of 
global politics repeats some mistakes of Europe’s 
past.
To fulfil their potential, however, strategic 
partnerships must be guided by the European 
interest. They must be useful instruments to 
pursue European goals, including the interests of 
the Member States. This, in turn, raises two 
issues: first, the need to consider each 
partnership as a specific case in its own right 
and, therefore, to identify shared bilateral 
interests; and, second, the combination and 
articulation of common interests between the 
EU as such and its own Member States, which 
explains the role of the European Council in 
terms of strategic orientation.
Although strategic partnerships are commonly 
seen as key priorities of EU “foreign” policy, the 
substance of such partnerships falls – more often 
than not – within the Commission’s own 
competences. Indeed, if one looks at the agendas 
of the forthcoming summits with the strategic 
partners, it is quite obvious that most of the 
discussions will touch upon such issues as trade, 
development, climate change, energy policy, 
justice and home affairs, migration and so on. 
In other words, both the European Council and 
the European Commission are key stakeholders 
in all strategic partnerships – which vindicates 
the institutional interdependence in external 
relations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. 
bepa monthly 
September 2010 - Issue 39
9
Départs
Tassos Belessiotis participe au programme 
“EU Fellowships” et travaillera aux Etats-Unis 
sur le projet de recherche lancé par l’université 
de Yale “Divergences in a Monetary Union: The 
case of the Euro Area and a discussion of the 
Canadian and US experience”.
Stefano Bertozzi a regagné le Conseil de 
l’Europe, en tant que Conseiller spécial au 
Bureau de liaison avec l’Union Européenne à 
Bruxelles. Avant son départ, Stefano a finalisé 
deux études d’ores et déjà publiées sur le site du 
BEPA (voir ci-dessous).
Evénements
Le 1er juillet Margaritis Schinas, chef adjoint du 
BEPA, a rencontré une délégation de vingt 
membres du Parlement grec en visite officielle à 
la Commission. M. Schinas a présenté les 
priorités politiques du collège Barroso II et les 
initiatives de la Commission pour contrer les 
effets de la crise économique, y compris les 
instruments de stabilisation pour la Grèce et les 
propositions de gouvernance du système 
économique et monétaire.
Le 9 juillet le BEPA a organisé un séminaire sur 
la lutte contre la pauvreté et l’exclusion sociale, 
dans le cadre de la stratégie EU 2020. Cet 
événement a été organisé en partenariat avec la 
COMECE et la CEC, les organes rassemblant 
toutes les Eglises chrétiennes d’Europe.
Le 12 juillet le BEPA a rencontré les think tanks 
basés à Bruxelles pour présenter le nouveau 
service et entamer les discussions sur une future 
collaboration.
Sonia Neto et João Marques de Almeida ont 
assisté le Président dans la préparation et la 
conduite de sa visite au Brésil du 14 au 17 juillet, 
à l’occasion du sommet EU - Brésil.
Le 19 juillet, le Président Barroso, Jerzy Buzek, 
président du Parlement européen, et Herman 
van Rompuy, président du Conseil européen, ont 
rassemblé les hauts dignitaires religieux pour 
débattre des moyens de lutte contre la pauvreté 
et l’exclusion sociale. C’était la sixième édition de 
cette rencontre annuelle, lancée en 2005 par le 
président Barroso.
Le 21 septembre, le 19e Séminaire Jacquemin a 
été consacré à la présentation de Steven Hill 
(chroniqueur et politologue américain), 
“Europe’s Promise: Why the European Way Is 
(Still) the Best Hope for an Insecure Age”, qui 
est aussi le titre de son dernier ouvrage.
Activités à venir
Le 27 octobre à 18h00 le Président Barroso 
dévoilera une plaque commémorative à la mémoire 
du Président Ortoli. La “Salle Hebdo” du 13e étage 
du Berlaymont sera également rebaptisée “Salle 
Ortoli”. Les parallèles entre les Présidents Ortoli et 
Barroso sont nombreux : Présidents à l’âge de 48 
ans, titulaires de deux mandats consécutifs au sein 
du Collège, tous deux engagés notamment à gérer 
un élargissement important pour la Communauté, à 
faire face à une crise économique majeure et à 
composer avec un Conseil européen dont le rôle 
évolue de manière substantielle…
La DG Recherche, en coopération avec le BEPA a 
lancé un exercice de prospective à l’horizon 2030 
de la région euro-méditerranéenne, “Euromed 
2030”. Un groupe d’experts a été constitué et s’est 
réuni à quatre reprises, la dernière les 16/17 
septembre à Istanbul. Un rapport final avec les 
tendances, les tensions, les scénarios ainsi que les 
recommandations, sera présenté à Bruxelles le 
16 décembre prochain dans une initiative dans le 
cadre del a Présidence belge.
Publications
Stefano Bertozzi (ed.), Opening Europe's doors to 
low-skilled and unskilled workers: http://
ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/publications_pdf/
special_editions/practical_handbook.pdf
Stefano Bertozzi, Madrid: A European capital 
embracing integration: http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/
pdf/publications_pdf/madrid.pdf
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